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ABSTRACT 
 
 In this paper, the authors explore the resistance of 
many--especially large--nonprofit organizations to the practice of 
transparency.  We argue that this resistance reflects the stubborn 
attitude of elitists who usually govern the nonprofits that ordinary 
individuals need no more rights and information than the elite class 
cares to offer them.  Organizational leaders withhold comprehensible 
information about the nonprofits’ finances and records of the boards’ 
policy deliberations.  Suppression of such information denies 
prospective donors the knowledge that would allow them to make 
optimal decisions about where to invest their charitable donations.  The 
authors present a summary of 85 Georgia charities to identify 
independent variables that are related to the charities’ willingness to 
publicize minutes of their board meetings.  Only one independent 
variable has a statistically significant relationship with the willingness to 
publicize minutes:  That is the availability of audited financial statements 
on the website.  It is difficult to justify donors’ submission of donations 
to charities that are less than generous in sharing with the public honest 
information about their operations. 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 Many charitable and religious organizations are dependent on the generosity of 
Americans so that the institutions’ programs can be funded.  These organizations benefit 
considerably from the remarkable extent to which Americans are receptive to charitable 
solicitations.  Additionally, many of these institutions are reliant on Americans’ 
willingness to donate their unpaid labor, an impressive sacrifice in these organizations’ 
behalf. 
 
 
 
 
SECRECY AND TRANSPARENCY IN NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 2 
 
 
 Contrarily, many or most charitable and religious organizations are not generous 
in the least with the information that they gather about organizational processes and with 
records of the leaders’ deliberations about policies, such as minutes of board meetings.  
That charitable institutions operate on the expectation that Americans will sacrifice 
money and time but that these agencies hold their cards so close to the vest is a contrast 
that intrigues and offends many observers.  The organizations’ leaders and public-
relations specialists regularly talk fast to repel demands for accountability and disclosure. 
 
 In this paper, we explore these kinds of contradictions, review literature that 
makes a case for transparency, and propose that Americans might consider directing their 
generosity to charities and religious organizations that demonstrate respect for their 
stakeholders’ right to know. 
 
 
B. The Appeal of Corruption and Insider Privilege 
 
 All organizations are managed by human beings and their workforces consist of 
human beings.  Many human beings are corrupt, selfish, and callous.  Those who have 
these characteristics start out with or develop the attitude that they deserve more 
authority and resources than others do.  We sometimes speak of someone who was born 
with a silver spoon in his mouth.  Some individuals are appointed to management 
positions that give them privileged status in their organizations and in the community.  
Having an advantaged position appeals to such people and, very commonly, their 
expectations for more privileges increase with the passage of time. 
 
 Outcomes of these attitudes and resulting behaviors vary.  Some of these notables 
are eventually memorialized with buildings and roadways that are named after them.  
Others’ arrogance catches up with them, as in the notorious case of William Aramony, late 
CEO of the United Way of America, whose use of organization resources to live a royal 
lifestyle is a story enshrined for posterity in numerous books about managerial ethics. 
 
 
C. The Attraction of Secrecy 
 
 Those who operate organizations are attracted by the advantages of secrecy.  This 
is true as much for organizations in the public sector as for those created to generate 
profit.  “. . . [T]oo much is kept secret not to protect Americans but to keep embarrassing 
or illegal conduct from Americans,” wrote Schwarz (2015, p. 2) in his study of government 
secrecy.  Bennis, Goleman, and Biederman (2008, pp. 20-21) observed: 
 
 . . . [L]eaders often routinely mishandle information, setting a bad 
example for the entire group.  A common malady among organizational 
insiders is hoarding information.  This is one of many ways information gets 
stuck in organizations and is kept from flowing to those who need it to make 
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solid decisions. . . .  One reason for the hoarding of information by a small 
clique of insiders is the all-too-human tendency to want to know things that 
others do not. . . . 
 
 Publisher Joseph Pulitzer explained the necessity--for those engaged in 
wrongdoing--of secrecy:  “There is not a crime, there is not a dodge, there is not a trick, 
there is not a swindle, there is not a vice which does not live by secrecy” (quoted in Taylor 
and Kelsey, 2016, p. 13).  But Schwarz (2015, p. 3) adds that it is not only corruption that 
raises a desire for secrecy.  “Human nature and bureaucratic incentives favor secrecy over 
openness,” he says.  “Secrecy is seductive.” 
 
 If the purpose of secrecy is to conceal corruption, then, of course, the secrecy is 
improper.  “. . . [I]f you have to keep what you are doing secret, then what you are doing 
is wrong,” Taylor and Kelsey (2016, p. 15) bluntly declare.  Secrecy may also be 
problematic, in any event, if the secrecy emboldens those who have not yet crossed the 
line to branch out into unethical conduct. 
 
 
D. The Rationale for Oligarchic Control 
 
 In the 1770s, Americans firmly rejected the rule of monarchy and aristocracy and 
proclaimed the legitimacy of equality, democracy, and liberty.  All men are created equal, 
they declared.  The successful American revolution offered the promise of an egalitarian 
society.  The abundance of land in North America offered the opportunity for every family 
to own land, produce agriculture, and operate as its own profit center among millions of 
others.  The confederal system of governance offered the opportunity for people in states 
and local communities to govern themselves democratically.  Alexis de Tocqueville 
([1835]/1956, Ch. 29) described the thriving galaxy of clubs and associations that 
addressed community problems democratically and voluntarily.  “Rule by a few” had 
given way to “rule by the many.”  There seemed to be no call for the oppressive force of 
social class to establish variable levels of social and economic power. 
 
 In the late 1780s, Americans engaged in another desperate battle on the matter of 
who should rule.  This one, a bloodless contest, involved the Federalist faction, which 
wanted to centralize control in a federal system of government, and the Anti-Federalist 
faction, which wanted to preserve the state and local control established in the Articles of 
Confederation.  The Federalist faction, dominated by the affluent business class, out-
organized the Anti-Federalists and succeeded in imposing on American society a federal 
Constitution, pursuant to which a powerful national government could keep a lid on state 
and local popular movements. 
 
 . . . [T]he American elite now had a Constitution that would be used 
(or ignored) to their advantage even to the present day. . . . 
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 Local opponents [of the proposed Constitution], though they 
supported state sovereignty through their support of the Articles [of 
Confederation], were largely common Americans who feared a strong 
centralized government dominated by the wealthy--a government that, 
through its power, would deprive them of the liberties they had fought for 
in the Revolution (Leavitt, 2013, pp. 40, 82). 
 
The Federalist faction’s lead spokesman, Alexander Hamilton, would go on to serve as 
President George Washington’s treasury secretary and orchestrate centralized oversight 
of the economy.  The decentralized confederal system preferred by the masses gave way 
to a hierarchical system preferred and directed by the elites. 
 
While one would expect that the principal beneficiaries of the charitable sector 
would be people in need, it appears to be inevitable that the sector’s institutions will be 
controlled by relatively affluent individuals who conduct the organizations’ business in 
other than a democratic, egalitarian fashion.  In his 1911 book Political Parties, Roberto 
Michels made the memorably chilling statement, “Who says organization says oligarchy” 
(Michels, 1962, p. 365).  Thus, he is credited with the “iron law of oligarchy.”  That 
institutions of any significance are controlled by elites who tend to operate the institutions 
in ways that bring them gratification is no surprise to sociologists, who have studied the 
phenomenon for many decades.  Guo, Metelsky, and Bradshaw (2014, p. 52) wrote: 
 
 Class hegemony theory is a sociological theory which is generally 
Marxist in origin. . . .  It was predominantly used to examine nonprofit 
governance when such scholarship was in its infancy. . . .  Class hegemony 
theory contends that the upper class dominates key societal institutions 
through the participation of business elites in the governance of 
institutions. . . .  This theory argues that power is shared by a cohesive upper 
class of corporate elites who hold a similar worldview . . ., and who have 
shared interests and common purposes. . . . 
 
 The elites govern the organizations and appoint each other to their boards, creating 
a system of “interlocking directorates.”  Accordingly, the culture of nonprofit 
organizations is relatively consistent across the sector.  This culture has little to do with 
democracy and participation in decision making, as Freiwirth (2014, p. 184) explains. 
 
 Traditional governance approaches, based largely on corporate 
board models and top-down “command and control” paradigms, still 
dominate in the nonprofit sector. . . .  Even though some research suggests 
that the application of corporate governance models is ineffective for 
nonprofits . . . they still prevail in the sector.  These governance models 
feature strong, inherent demarcations to separate the board, constituents, 
stakeholders, and staff, with the executive director often the only link to the 
various parts of the organization.  This type of separation commonly 
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disconnects the board and, ultimately, the organization from the very 
communities they serve.  It also often inhibits effective governance and 
accountability. 
 
 
1. PRAGMATIC MANAGERIAL AND STATUS ARGUMENTS 
 
 The argument that organizations should freely disclose details about its operations 
appeals to the general public.  However, actual decision-makers who could implement 
politics of openness view the notion of equal access to information with a jaundiced eye.  
Taylor and Kelsey (2016, p. 24) explain that theories of economics have little regard for 
the unrestricted flow of information. 
 
 In economics, transparency has no intrinsic moral value and 
information is not a human right. . . .  The economic tradition starts from a 
position of caveat emptor and requires a justification for imposing 
transparency based on evidence that it is necessary to prevent fraudulent 
trading or malfunctioning markets. 
 
 Organizational owners, directors, and executives harbor attitudes such as these: 
 
 The organizations’ information is the property of the organizations and their 
leadership.  Other members of the organizations and outsiders have no claim 
on the information, unless laws specify otherwise. 
 
 Disclosure to other members of the organizations and outsiders has no purpose 
because they are not in a position to do anything productive with it. 
 
 A policy of unrestricted disclosure would compromise the active, productive 
exchange of information among the leaders.  For example, Taylor and Kelsey 
(2016, p. 34) say, “The main concern about transparency [in government] is the 
damage it does to the deliberative process.” 
 
 Many nonprofit organizations’ officials react to the concept of transparency as if it 
is a threat.  This is not unlike the frequent reaction of such officials to the concept of 
democratic and participatory decision-making, which they similarly perceive as a threat.  
Undoubtedly, the two reactions come from the same place and are directed, essentially, 
at the same idea--that others have a legitimate stake in what the organization does and, 
therefore, should be able to influence it.  Freiwirth (2014, pp. 184-185) has explained the 
behavior and the lamentable result. 
 
 . . . [T]he pervasive trend toward “professionalism,” with boards 
made up of “experts” who may not be engaged with the organization’s 
mission, has tended to deepen the class and power divide between boards 
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and their communities.  Ultimately, these models often prevent nonprofits 
from being effective--that is, from being responsive, adaptable, and 
accountable to the communities they ostensibly serve. 
  
 Beth Kanter and Allison Fine . . . describe the normative state of 
many nonprofits as “fortressed organizations” that “sit behind high walls 
and drawn shades, holding the outside world at bay to keep secrets in and 
invaders out.”  Unfortunately, this description applies to the many nonprofit 
boards that follow traditional, insular governance models. 
  
 . . . [I]t can be argued that the nonprofit sector should foster and 
advance democracy and self-determination.  If a nonprofit organization is 
to be truly accountable to the community and constituencies, democracy 
must be at the organization’s core.  Yet the nonprofit sector has typically 
replicated structures and processes that actually hinder democracy within 
organizations.  Traditional governance structures not only run counter to 
democratic values and ideals, but can also impede an organization’s efforts 
to achieve its goals and fulfill its mission.  If an organization’s constituencies 
are not included in key decision-making processes, they may be less likely 
to back the organization with their advocacy, volunteer time, and financial 
support.  Additionally, a nonprofit without such involvement risks arriving 
at conclusions or decisions that are incongruent with its constituents’ needs, 
even its own mission. . . . 
 
 One result of this resistance is that many officials of nonprofit organizations will 
deem it unthinkable to make the minutes of board and committee meetings available to 
members, donors, and other members of the public.  Irish et al. (2004) observe that civic 
organizations “should . . . be required to maintain records of meetings of their governing 
bodies” (p. 68), but the authors don’t seem to want anyone else to see them:  “. . . [A 
disclosure] requirement should not extend to the regular meetings of the governing board 
or other decision-making bodies, which should be allowed to conduct deliberations in 
private” (pp. 73-74).  If such instruments of the nonprofit need to keep their discussions 
and decisions secret, who are the adversaries who must be kept uninformed about what 
the decisions are?  Are these adversaries the same people whom the organization begs to 
donate money and unpaid labor? 
 
 Secret leadership is deficient leadership.  “Self-awareness, openness, transparency, 
and consistency are at the core of authentic leadership,” say Brown and Treviño (2006, 
p. 599). 
 
Who are qualified to decide what information is or is not disclosed?  According to 
the opinion of organizational leaders as well as the laws, the owners or members of boards 
of directors are fully qualified to make that determination.  For example: 
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 The board-centered model of governance has been adopted by 
nonprofit and voluntary organizations throughout the United States to 
address a number of practical organizational issues ranging from 
stakeholder management to legal supervision. . . .  Historically, the adoption 
of a board-centered model of governance has been seen as a way for 
organizations to convey legitimacy, ensure public interest, and preserve 
traditions of representative institutions . . . (LeRoux and Langer, 2016, 
p. 147). 
 
The theory that the distribution of information in an organization is based on 
differential, not equal, access spurs the development of institutional customs about how 
information is to be exchanged.  The “shimmer factor” creates one custom. 
 
 . . . [L]eaders . . . tend to be perceived by many as demigods.  And 
that perception still deters followers from telling those leaders essential but 
awkward truths . . . (Bennis, Goleman, and Biederman, 2008, p. 24). 
 
Leslie Perlow and Nelson Repenning reported that there is “a basic cultural 
commandment in engineering[:  D]on’t tell someone you have a problem unless you have 
a solution” (quoted in Bennis et al., 2008, p. 31).  “Such unspoken professional rules may 
have a profound impact on how an organization functions” (Bennis et al., 2008, 
pp. 31-32).  Organizational culture discourages employees from sharing bad news with 
upper management.  This is known, according to Swiss (1991, p. 73), as the “Bureaucratic 
Law of Gravity,” or, according to Dickson (2013, p. 133), as “Gray’s Law of Bilateral 
Asymmetry in Networks”:  “Information flows efficiently through organizations, except 
that bad news encounters high impedance in flowing upward.” 
 
 Lest anyone believe that the behavior of keeping secrets is instilled in members of 
economic organizations without prior experience in their lives, Bennis et al. (2008, p. 34) 
say that one’s first introduction to secret-keeping originates in the family unit: 
 
 Every family tacitly teaches each member four attentional rules: 
 
 ● These are the things we notice. 
 ● This is what we say about them. 
 ● These are the things we don’t notice. 
 ● And we never say anything to outsiders about the third category. 
 
It seems that secret-keeping is a behavior learned early in life.  It is not difficult to train 
members of formal organizations to draw on that skill when they are adults. 
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2. LEGAL PROTECTIONS OF OLIGARCHIC CONTROL 
 
 A nonprofit organization is under complete control by its governing board.  Alleva, 
Michal, and Torres (2014, p. 12) explain the extent of responsibility. 
 
 . . . [U]ltimate responsibility for financial management rests with the 
board.  The board sets the tone for the entire organization, not only in terms 
of mission and policies but also through structure and the individuals 
charged with executing day-to-day functions.  The board sets policy and 
delegates management to an executive director (ED) and a chief financial 
officer (CFO) or a controller, accountant, or bookkeeper, depending on the 
size of the organization, to ensure that its policies arre carried out.  Several 
characteristics are important to board members and managers: 
 
 ● Care:  High-ranking individuals should attend meetings regularly, 
exercise independent judgment, and remain informed about the workings 
of the organization. . . . 
 ● Loyalty:  Board members and senior staff should not have conflicts 
of interest that could compromise the ethical standards of the organization.  
They should also exercise confidentiality by not revealing sensitive 
organizational, financial, or human resource information. 
 ● Obedience:  Board members and managers should believe in the 
mission of the organization and protect it. 
 ● Stewardship:  Individuals should participate in the creation of 
accountability mechanisms in the organization’s policies, programs, 
outcomes, efficiencies, and finances. 
 
 Renz emphasizes that the principal obligation of board members is to “reflect[] 
well on the work and reputation of the organization.”  But doing so is operationally 
defined as protecting the board.  He states that a board member must “honor and actively 
support all board decisions, once they have been made, and treat the content of board 
deliberations with confidence and discretion” (Renz, 2010, p. 136).  Thus, if the board has 
done something improper, a dissenting member can do nothing more than resign.  Even 
his resignation will not release him from the legal duty to keep the impropriety 
confidential. 
 
 The laws and other rules that establish board members’ duties of loyalty, diligence, 
and confidentiality tend to be explained in such a way as to establish that board members 
may be held accountable should they use their positions for personal gain contrary to the 
organizations’ best interests.  This approach assumes that most board members are acting 
properly, and that a devious board member might act improperly unbeknownst to the rest 
of the members.  Thus, laws and rules demand that board members disclose to the entire 
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board possible conflicts of interest and other threats to the organization’s well-being.  A 
more complicated situation involves an entire board running afoul of its legitimate 
responsibilities. 
 
 The board collectively is responsible and may be liable for what 
transpires within and what happens to the organization.  As the ultimate 
authority, the board should ensure that the organization is operating in 
compliance with the law and its governing instruments.  If legal action 
ensues, it is often traceable to an inattentive, passive, and/or captive board 
(Hopkins and Gross, 2010, p. 58). 
 
 Short of the intervention of government authorities, a board--“as the ultimate 
authority”--is responsible to nobody other than itself.  As a practical matter, the board is 
not responsible to other members of the organization.  It is not responsible to donors.  It 
is not responsible to volunteers.  It is not responsible to the local community.  If a board 
member believes that the board is deficient in its service or demonstration of 
responsibility to such groups, her duties of loyalty, diligence, and confidentiality to the 
board--the ultimate authority--preclude her disclosure to anyone other than the Internal 
Revenue Service and the state’s attorney general.  Should the board member disclose to 
actual stakeholders, she may find herself the target of a lawsuit, and the organization’s 
cost of legal representation will be handled by the organization’s treasury.  This vicious 
circle in which the board is responsible only to itself silences board members and deprives 
the public of information.  It is little wonder why the public does not know to this day why 
Jerry Lewis was unceremoniously removed in 2012 as the master of ceremonies of the 
Muscular Dystrophy Association’s Labor Day telethon.  Lewis had nothing to say, and 
likely was legally constrained by the duty of loyalty, diligence, and confidentiality from 
explaining to donors and patients why he was dismissed after 45 years as host of the 
annual event.  The public, which donated $2½ billion to MDA during Lewis’s run as host 
and national chairman, would like to know the reason for the falling out in so far as it 
would help donors make informed decisions about their support, but the law is oriented 
toward protection of the interests of the organization’s remaining leadership. 
 
 
E. The Logic of Accountability 
 
 In a democratic, constitutional system like the United States, every individual and 
every organization are accountable.  As John Adams, second president of the United 
States, put it, the government system is one of laws and not of men.  There are 
innumerable constitutional provisions, statutes, and regulations to which every 
American--from the lowliest laborer to the nation’s president--is accountable.  An 
individual, a business owner, or a member of a board of directors who acts contrary to the 
rules risks paying a price for the offense.  No one is exempt from accountability.  
Accountability can be defined as “that obligation on organisations or people to give an 
account of themselves to others” (Taylor and Kelsey, 2016, p. 64). 
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 While the government’s processes of imposing accountability can involve the 
imposition of frightful penalties--possibly including fines, imprisonment, or capital 
punishment--other actors may also have enough influence to impose their own 
accountability devices.  Consumers may be offended by a corporate scandal and shift their 
patronage to other retailers. 
 
 “. . . [A]ccountability is relational in nature, and it becomes essential to decide who 
the ‘relevant’ stakeholders are,” Sanzo-Pérez, Rey-Garcia, and Álvarez-González (2017, 
p. 1599) wrote.  Government authorities, watchdogs, financial institutions, and an 
assortment of stakeholders are potentially motivated to call an organization to account.  
Taylor and Kelsey (2016, p. 64) explain: 
 
 We use the term “accountability” to refer to political systems through 
which individuals and organisations can punish or reward on the basis of 
such information--including both formal and informal systems from social 
ostracism and media condemnation, through choosing alternatives or 
actively boycotting particular organisations or services, through voting in 
elections and challenging in the courts, all the way through to public protest 
and insurrection.  These are all ways in which people are held to account. 
 
Alleva, Michael, and Torres (2014, p. 7) describe “three important questions” 
facing the nonprofit sector:  (1) “how to define the value of work being done,” (2) “how to 
measure that value,” and (3) “how to ensure that revenues . . . maximize returns on 
investment and are spent according to the highest standards of accountability and 
transparency.” 
 
 It may be helpful to develop a list of the people and organizations to whom 
nonprofit organizations--notably charities--are responsible. 
 
 
1. GOVERNMENT 
 
 Nonprofit organizations would be all but above the law were it not for the Internal 
Revenue Code and the Internal Revenue Service’s enforcement of the code.  Hopkins and 
Gross (2010, p. 60) explain: 
 
 At this time, . . . there is little federal law applicable to the governance 
of tax-exempt organizations.  Although a few provisions of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act passed in 2002 apply to nonprofit organizations, 
Congress has not yet enacted laws that affect the governance, oversight, and 
management of nonprofit organizations to any significant degree. 
 
 Each large nonprofit is required to file a Form 990 return, which involves 
information about revenues and expenditures, top executives’ pay, and a variety of 
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compliance issues.  Upon Congress’s enactment of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 
and the completion of the IRS’s strategy to implement the law, every nonprofit 
organization became obligated to file some form of a 990 return.  Even the smallest 
nonprofit organization fails to file a 990-N electronic (“postcard”) return at its own peril.  
After three consecutive years of noncompliance with the filing requirement, a nonprofit 
will lose its tax-exempt status.  The information that appears on the various 990 forms 
becomes a public record. 
 
 Most state governments have few laws pertaining to nonprofit organizations and 
little enforcement activity.  Hopkins and Gross (2010, p. 60) report: 
 
 Certain states have enacted laws regarding the accountability of 
nonprofit organizations; the state of California has the most extensive set of 
rules concerning governance and accountability of nonprofit organizations, 
mainly due to the state’s enactment of the Nonprofit Integrity Act in 2004.  
Most state provisions, to the extent they exist, require audited financial 
statements for nonprofit organizations with revenues in excess of a certain 
threshold. 
 
Mulgan (2014, p. 7) is unimpressed by the extent to which nonprofit organizations 
are accountable to government agencies. 
 
 [Nonprofits], such as charities and churches, are even less 
transparent and accountable to the public [compared to business firms].  
They tend to place a great deal of trust in the professional dedication and 
altruistic commitment of their members and see less reason to subject 
themselves to extensive public scrutiny. . . .  Public regulation of charitable 
organizations is generally patchy and superficial. 
 
 The level of accountability will rise somewhat when nonprofits are spending 
government-supplied grant money.  When charitable organizations receive grants from 
government agencies, the agencies inevitably specify standards of accountability.  Alleva, 
Michael, and Torres (2014, p. 8) explain: 
 
 Government underwrites social investment, and the elected officials 
who approve the budgets from which so much grant and program funding 
is primarily drawn are primarily interested in three things: 
 
 ● Appearing to do something about the social problems that bedevil 
our society. 
 ● Equitable distribution of resources among issues and the 
organizations that exist to address them. 
 ● Keeping within the letter of the law. 
 
 
 
SECRECY AND TRANSPARENCY IN NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 12 
 
 
 As a result, most social service organizations and their elected 
funders are activity driven and activity oriented, focusing on the “how 
many” questions:  How many meals were cooked and served in the soup 
kitchen to how many people?  How many middle schoolers attended the 
after-school program?  The advent of categorical funding inexorably led to 
a focus on head counts. 
 
 
2. FOUNDATIONS AND OTHER ORGANIZED FUNDERS 
 
 Nonprofit organizations are aware of the need to practice “upward 
accountability”--accountability to their sources of funding.  Sanzo-Pérez, Rey-Garcia, and 
Álvarez-González (2017, p. 1599) write: 
 
 , , , [H]ierarchical accountability “is narrowly functional, short-term 
in orientation and favors accountability to those stakeholders who control 
access to key resources for both resource use and immediate (campaign) 
impacts” (O’Dwyer and Unerman 2008, p. 803).  This approach emphasizes 
accountability to powerful patrons (upward accountability)--donors and 
governments--thus narrowing accountability relationships (Ebrahim, 
2003a, b, 2005).  On the one hand, holistic accountability “considers 
multiple stakeholder groups, with a significant emphasis being placed on 
downward accountability to beneficiaries (Dixon et al. 2006) in addition to 
upward accountability to donors and governments” (O’Dwyer and Unerman 
2008, p. 804).  New [information and communication technologies], and 
Internet-based ones in particular, facilitate the implementation of holistic 
accountability (Vaccaro 2012). 
 
 The second motive why implementing nonprofit accountability is so 
arduous lies in the difficult balance between “the instrumental, resource-
seeking, and practical dimension . . . and the expressive, value-oriented, and 
resource-consuming dimension” that distinguishes [nonprofit 
organizations (NPOs)] from other types of organizations.  NPOs must fulfill 
instrumental accountability to strategic resource providers, be [they] 
external--the case of business partners--or internal--such as paid staff--but 
at the same time they must commit to their expressive accountability to the 
community, to the organizational mission, and to clients and members, or 
they risk losing their very reason for existence (Knutsen and Brower, 2010). 
 
 
3. WATCHDOGS 
 
 In so far as laws and court precedents do not recognize donors as having standing 
in terms of extracting information from an organization, beyond what laws and 
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regulations require, donors must take specific steps to obtain information that they may 
want.  In other words, a donor or some separate watchdog organization that attempts to 
represent the interests of donors (such as the Better Business Bureau’s Wise Giving 
Alliance, Charity Navigator, and GuideStar) may ask for the information--and criticize the 
charity for being unwilling to offer it--or insist on a contract that specifies what kind of 
information one or more donors want and will receive. 
 
 Generally, the watchdog organizations obtain and process information that 
appears on charities’ already available 990 returns.  However, the watchdog organizations 
may also survey the organizations about various aspects of their governing and 
management practices. 
 
Other types of information may be difficult to come by.  Irish, Kushen, and Simon 
(2004, pp. 72-73) state: 
 
 Donors to a formal civic organization are entitled to contract for 
disclosure of information adequate for the donor to assess the suitability of 
the civic organization for receipt of donations and the use(s) to which 
donations, or that particular donor’s donations, are put. 
 
 . . . The reporting requirements imposed by donors will be 
contractual obligations enforceable in court.  Generally speaking, it is up to 
each donor to require whatever information it wants from a civic 
organization.  As a matter of best practice, however, donors should impose 
conditions that will require civic organizations to be accountable to their 
beneficiaries, to maintain adequate financial records and statements, to 
avoid conflicts of interest, and to comply with other good management 
practices.  By imposing appropriate contractual conditions, donors can play 
a significant role in assuring the health and proper operation of the civic 
sector.  It would be desirable for donors, public and private, to meet and 
agree among themselves what the minimum reporting requirements and 
performance for grantees should be and to standardize them to the extent 
possible. 
 
 That “it would be desirable for donors . . . to meet and agree among themselves” 
suggests that no such thing will happen in reality.  There is no substitute for inside 
information that arises in “real time.”  It is difficult to ask questions about a subject that 
is concealed behind closed doors. 
 
 
4. NEWS MEDIA 
 
 Perhaps one way to approach newspaper and broadcast-news editors’ decision-
making processes concerning how much association news to publish is to relate the 
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three general models of how journalism can promote democracy.  Schudson (1999, 
pp. 119-120, emphasis added) describes the market model, the advocacy model, and the 
trustee model.  His description shows the tremendous tension with which reporters must 
deal:  On one hand, they attribute to themselves a lofty duty to inform the public, but, on 
the other hand, they are employees of profit-making enterprises that must enhance the 
bottom line, often to maximize the wealth of stockholders. 
 
 To oversimplify dramatically, there have been three general models 
in American history of how journalism might serve democracy.  These are 
the market model, in which journalists serve the public best by providing 
whatever the public demands; the advocacy model, in which journalism 
serves the public by being an agency for the transmission of political party 
perspectives; and the trustee model, in which professional journalists 
provide news they believe citizens should have to be informed participants 
in democracy.  I discuss each of these models briefly and try to explain the 
challenge public journalism poses in urging a revised trustee model on the 
press. 
 
 In market model journalism, journalists should seek to please 
audiences or, at least, those audiences that advertisers find attractive.  
Whatever these advertiser-friendly audiences demand, they should receive.  
Consumer demand is the ultimate arbiter of the news product.  Market 
model ideologists may speak of democracy or at least of consumer 
sovereignty, but they do not mean it:  The consumer is sovereign only as 
long as the consumer is willing to choose among commercially viable 
choices, only as long as consumer preferences are to be evaluated in the 
short run, and only as long as consumers with more dollars have more say 
than consumers with less. 
 
 Market model journalism is anathema to journalists themselves.  
They may cite it in apology for what they do, to explain why their best efforts 
are often thwarted, but they never refer to it as an ideal or aspiration.  It is 
the model of the business office, not the newsroom.  This gives it enduring 
influence; for instance, it almost exclusively governs all local television 
news.  But it is the model that any self-respecting journalist fears and 
loathes. . . . 
 
 In trustee model journalism, journalists are to provide news 
according to what they themselves as a professional group believe citizens 
should know.  The professional journalist’s quest for truth and fairness, 
exercising sound and critical judgment as measured by a jury of peers, 
should dictate the shape of the news.  Journalists ordinarily accept the 
trustee model as the only alternative to market-driven journalism.  
Journalism is understood as a constant battle between the bad guys 
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upholding market model news (i.e., the business office, the deal makers, 
and the Frank Munseys and Rupert Murdochs) and the good guys 
upholding trustee model news, the dedicated, professional journalists who 
speak truth to power and follow the story wherever it may lead, whomever 
it may embarrass, and however few readers it might attract. 
 
 In this model, journalists imagine a public that is often too 
preoccupied and too distracted to be sovereign of its own citizenship.  
Citizens then entrust a measure of sovereignty to journalists just as people 
entrust a measure of control over their bodies to doctors.  The journalists 
are professionals who hold our citizenship in trust for citizens and whose 
expertise or political analysis citizens rely on when they want information 
about the state of the country. 
 
But Stiff (1984, p. 9) says that news organizations have a duty to promote and perpetuate 
themselves, thus justifying that kind of activity. 
 
 The business side of our newspaper has an absolute right to meet its 
corporate responsibility as a good citizen and do what it can to defeat a 
threat to the state’s future economic health.  Business success is necessary 
if we are to fulfill our First Amendment responsibilities and our community 
obligations. 
 
 Thus, journalists are left in a quandary.  The factors that militate in favor of giving 
in to the pressure to deliver what an audience wants to read or hear are these:   
(a) Reporting news that few people want to read or hear is very much like talking to a wall.  
What productive use is there to communicating in a figurative vacuum?  (b) A reporter’s 
ambition to become prominent and to have her work recognized by peers can be 
obstructed by the lack of interest in her reporting.  (c) Failing to attract a readership or 
viewership constitutes a hardship to the employer.  What fulfillment is there in 
undermining the prosperity of one’s employer?  The factors that argue in favor of 
honoring the culture of journalism are these:  (a) A journalist’s credibility is based largely 
on appearing to be independent of such matters as who the advertiser is; what party or 
cause his editor, publisher, or broadcast licensee is affiliated with; or the journalist’s own 
personal affiliations, ideology, and predilections.  (b) Participation in boosting causes and 
in reporting “puff” pieces diminishes the reporter’s apparent stature.  (c) Being associated 
with causes, candidates, advertisers, etc., can cause embarrassment to the reporter if any 
of those entities performs questionable actions later on. 
 
 There is a movement advocating “public journalism” that seeks to put the stamp of 
credibility on newspapers’ involvement in organizing the community instead of simply 
reporting about it. 
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 If a reporter seems critical of one or more nonprofit organizations, the editor-in-
chief may tell the reporter about negative feedback, or the editor of the letters-to-the-
editor column may print letters denouncing the reporter’s work. 
 
 Newspapers which wish to survive must think long before offending 
a strongly organized group such as the Chamber of Commerce, Ku Klux 
Klan, American Legion, Daughters of the American Revolution, Anti-Saloon 
leagues, American Federation of Labor, the Townsend clubs, ministerial 
associations and others which are or have been powerful (Smith, 1999, 
p. 237). 
 
In this regard, Woestendick (1984, pp. 74-75) tells a riveting tale about his school 
newspaper’s exposé of irregularities in the football program. 
 
 When I suggested to our staff at the [University of] Arizona Daily 
Star that we ought to check out the University of Arizona football program 
. . ., I had no idea where it would lead. . . . 
 
 As our reporters began an intensive investigation of every aspect of 
the football program, I became the target of a vicious campaign by the 
community. 
 
 In more than 35 years in the business, I have never been vilified or 
threatened more.  And this time the threats and the anger came not from 
the gun nuts or religious fanatics but from business leaders, wealthy alumni, 
the president of the university and other prominent citizens. 
 
 Business leaders met with me at a secret breakfast to tell me that we 
could not continue with this investigation because we would be destroying 
not only a great football program but a great university and a coach and his 
family.  Automobile dealers threatened to boycott us—and eventually did.  I 
was told that I was going to be run out of town and received letters 
threatening harm to my family. . . . 
 
 Other media in the city, including the television stations and the 
sports department of the opposition newspaper, ripped us unmercifully. . . . 
 
 The Arizona Daily Star won the Pulitzer Prize for the investigation. 
 
Less riveting, but more frequent on a routine, day-to-day basis, is the promotion of 
nonprofits that appears in newspapers and on radio and television news programs.  In the 
case of metropolitan newspapers, the helpful coverage (such as announcements about 
coming events and opportunities to participate, volunteer, and donate) may be placed in 
Sections C or E or H--a safe distance from the “hard news” that the newspaper’s ace 
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reporters write for the front page.  It is not considered a breach of journalistic 
independence for the newspaper’s staff to showcase the nonprofits on the back pages, 
where the nonprofits reside alongside the movie-theater schedules, celebrity gossip, the 
horoscope, and Dear Abby. 
 
The cleverly manipulative and deceptive nature of the fund-raising telethons 
explains why television news anchors invest their credibility in something so misleading 
that they ought to be giving these spectacles a wide berth.  Bakal (1979, pp. 354, 360) 
quotes Norman Kimball, who has produced telethons for United Cerebral Palsy and for 
several other charities:  “No telethon can make it on just on-the-air pledges, which are 
generally much smaller,” Kimball said.  “Besides, I can take our pretel money, which this 
year amounts to $500,000, or about 20 percent of the total we hope to get, and feed it 
into the tote board at regular intervals or, at certain times, to boost our total for dramatic 
impact—prime the pump, so to speak—particularly when our phone response is not as 
effective as we want it to be.”  Bakal describes Kimball’s activity at one such telethon:  “To 
reach this mark, Norman has fed $20,000 of pretel money into the tote board, the balance 
of the $78,000 boost coming from the phone pledges, according to Accounting figures.  
‘Every time I make a feed of my own, I’ll make a deduction on these cards in my hand, 
and I’ll tell Accounting on the other side how much money I’m putting in so that they can 
add this to their total,’ he explains.  ‘I started using the advance money sometime Sunday 
morning and by noon today I had used up about one-fifth of the half a million dollars I 
started with.  This means that from noon on I was hung up with four-fifths of the advance 
money, roughly $400,000.  Now you can’t feed this into the tote board at one fell swoop.  
You have to divide it into a number of pieces so that the feeds look reasonable, like they’re 
part of the response of the community.  So what I do is take the hours from 12 noon to six 
and divide the remainder of my advance gifts by six.  I then know that every hour I have 
to slowly feed in an average of $65,000 or $70,000 of the money.’” The implications to 
television news organization’s “on-air talent” are clear:  By standing in front of a 
scoreboard showing how many tens of thousands of dollars have been raised, they are, in 
all probability, reporting inaccurate numbers deliberately designed to mislead--and 
agitate--viewers so that they will call in pledges.  This leads to our observation that 
broadcast journalists interested in an informed public should avoid any association with 
these events. 
 
 Whether the information to make thoughtful judgments is actually reaching the 
general public is a matter, we would say, of substantial doubt.  This leaves the question 
about accountability of the nonprofit organizations and the ability of individuals to make 
informed decisions.  Erika F. Archibald, president and founder of PR for Nature, says that 
the public-relations managers of nonprofit organizations are adept at heading off 
embarrassing situations. 
 
 Nonprofit PR people keep a really good eye on the organization.  If 
they see a problem in the organization, the PR people try to stop it.  They 
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have to identify weaknesses and problems.  PR people look at problems 
occurring in similar nonprofit organizations. 
 
 To the extent that these efforts reduce the incidence of improprieties, they are 
valuable in and of themselves.  On the other hand, even those nonprofit organizations that 
are caught with their “hands in the cookie jar” seem to be remarkably immune to being 
held accountable.  If Levine’s analysis is correct, nonprofit organizations may even 
prove--ironically--to  be better off after being scandalized! 
 
 You’ve probably heard that the Chinese character for crisis is also the 
character for opportunity.  A well-planned crisis media response can 
actually build your reputation and create a positive outcome for your 
nonprofit. 
 
Heavens to Betsy!  Levine offers a “how-to” formula for planning for, and then handling, 
a crisis. 
 
 Developing strategies to handle crisis are of tantamount importance 
to the PR professional, because the worst part about a crisis is not in the 
immediate moment but in the long shelf-life that they continue to have 
years and years [afterwards]. 
 
 . . . In such a case, much of the publicist’s task involves basically 
reminding the public of the client’s solid, ethical core so that people will 
frame their perceptions with that essential point in mind. 
 
 First, it helps if you plan right now to implement a strategy of 
openness in the event of a crisis occurring to your organization.  Make a 
commitment to honesty and integrity in dealing with the press rather than 
initiating a campaign of lies and self-protectionism. 
 
 Secondly, develop a long-range crisis plan that accounts now for the 
many decisions you won’t have to make in the midst of a crisis (Levine, 
1998, pp. 263, 265, 267). 
 
 The concept of accountability is, therefore, turned on its head.  There is money to 
be made from a scandal.  The lesson that individuals would have to learn from these 
approaches is, of course, “Caveat emptor.” 
 
 Accordingly, if the public is deceived and donates to nonprofits that are acting in 
their own self-interests, the following outcomes result. 
 
 There is an unwarranted depletion of the donors’ resources.  Donors are 
entitled to the use and enjoyment of their wealth, in preference to aggrandizing 
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those who claim to act in altruistic interests but who are actually acting in their 
own interests. 
 
 The availability of resources to alleviate resources may be less than would 
otherwise be the case, if nonprofit managers are drawing off donations for their 
own benefit instead of to the benefit of disadvantaged individuals.  
Furthermore, unproductive soliciting may sap the energy that might otherwise 
go toward actually solving social problems.  Smith says:  “Obviously, most of 
the charitable and philanthropic activities of the press merely scratch the 
surface as far as alleviating the situations inspiring them.  More than a decade 
of almost continuous depression has taught Americans that neither breadlines 
nor made work is the remedy for unemployment and its underlying causes.  
Except as it prints articles and editorials by experts in economic and social 
problems, the newspaper does not contribute to the excavation work needed to 
uncover the roots of the trouble” (Smith, 1990, p. 169). 
 
 A vicious cycle may arise, in which the generating of benefits to nonprofit 
managers acting in their organizations’ and their personal interests encourages 
the perpetuation and expansion of the greedy practices. 
 
 The vicious cycle causes a distortion in the distribution of resources in the 
economy, with resources heading toward unproductive rather than productive 
destinations.  Misinformation violates an assumption of economics—viz., that 
participants in the marketplace are acting with the benefit of complete 
information about the transactions into which they enter. 
 
 A “drop-out” effect, in which some individuals, who might otherwise be 
benefactors, might withhold their donations can result, if these would-be 
philanthropists are aware of the problems with deception.  If the dropouts tend 
to be the most informed individuals, then the least informed individuals are the 
ones determining which charitable organizations are most prosperous, another 
distorting influence. 
 
 These outcomes argue in favor of more information and better analytical reporting 
about nonprofit organizations and their appeals for public support. 
 
 
5. INDIVIDUAL DONORS 
 
 Alleva, Michal, and Torres (2014, p. 9) write: 
 
 [Charity Navigator] is firm in its belief that 
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 ● Charitable donations should not be mere monetary gifts but rather 
social investments. 
 ● An informed donor is the best social investor. 
 ● Effective organizations represent the wisest and most meaningful 
investments. 
 ● An organization’s constituents deserve the best information to 
guide social investment decisions. 
 
 Behn, DeVries, and Lin (2010, p. 7) state: 
 
 While the goal of for-profit institutions arguably is profit 
maximization, nonprofit organizations strive for other goals.  However, 
efficiency and ownership issues do exist in nonprofits.  For example, donors 
want funds to be used efficiently, and not on bigger bonuses and better 
offices for officers, or for non or low-value added conferences and travel.  
While not publicly traded, nonprofit organizations compete for resources, 
whether funding, labor or managerial talent; therefore, they too have 
economic incentives similar to publicly traded firms without the ownership 
structure. 
 
 
6. VOLUNTEERS 
 
In exchange for their unpaid labor, volunteers are emphatically entitled to enjoy 
certain rights appropriate to their status and sacrifice.  Ilsley (1990, pp. 130-131) 
comments: 
 
. . . [M]anagers should never lose sight of the fact that the true 
strength of voluntarism lies in the forums it provides for involving citizens 
in public life and keeping our institutions alive and responsive.  Making sure 
that volunteers participate as much as possible in all parts of an 
organization and that their input is welcomed and utilized is one of the most 
important parts of a volunteer manager's job, for doing so can produce both 
deeper volunteer commitment and a more viable, flexible organization.  The 
following suggestions may help volunteer coordinators increase volunteer 
participation and input. 
 
• Allow volunteers to have a voice in designing procedures. . . . 
• Allow volunteers to take part in organizational decision 
making. . . . 
 
 
 
SECRECY AND TRANSPARENCY IN NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 21 
 
 
• Encourage volunteers to examine, express, and act on their 
values. . . . 
• Provide forums in which volunteers can discuss ideas, opinions, 
and feelings. . . . 
 
The reward for the organization that provides this recognition of volunteer rights 
and that shows a respect for volunteers is loyalty from the volunteers.  Speaking of public-
sector volunteer programs, Brudney (1995, p. 48) observes: 
 
Just as for paid staff, citizens [volunteers] are more likely to accept 
and endorse organizational policies and programs, and to generate useful 
input regarding them, if they enjoy ready access to the decision-making 
process.  Participation is key to empowerment of volunteers. 
. . .  Empowerment is thought to result in increased feelings of personal 
commitment and loyalty to the volunteer program by participants and 
hence greater retention and effectiveness. . . . 
  
 On the other hand, when American Red Cross field volunteers in Northeast 
Georgia decided to protest the Northeast Georgia Chapter board’s decision to withhold 
staff support from them, they asked various chapter, regional, and national officials to 
provide contact information for the members of volunteer leadership committees to 
whom they could deliver petitions.  Friedman (1997) continues the story: 
 
On January 9, 1996, this author wrote to ARC officials at the local, 
state, and national level, and invoked the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA), on account of ARC’s quasi-governmental status, to obtain the 
names of Red Cross leadership volunteers at the state and regional 
levels.  [Carol H.] Rittenhouse[, manager of ARC's Georgia Field Services], 
who had originally agreed to release the state list and then reneged, reversed 
herself and finally released the state list.  But [Michael L.] Bennett[, 
executive officer of the Southeastern Region of the Red Cross,] continued to 
conceal the names of the members of the regional committee.  On 
January 25, 1996, this author received a letter from Katherine Simonetti, 
associate general counsel in ARC's Office of the General Counsel in 
Washington, D. C., with this reply to the FOIA request: 
 
In response to your letter of January 9, 1996, which you 
copied to Richard Dashefsky, General Counsel, please note that as 
the Red Cross is not a government agency and makes no 
governmental decisions, it is not subject to the Freedom of 
Information Act.  Consequently, the Red Cross is not obligated under 
FOIA to provide to you the information which you requested. 
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Understand, then, that the Red Cross wants your money, unpaid 
labor, blood, and bone marrow--but for its part it prefers to operate in 
secrecy and to be governed by committees shrouded in anonymity. 
 
 
7. RECIPIENTS OF SERVICES 
 
Probably the most conspicuous purpose of charities is to redistribute resources 
from well-off people to disadvantaged individuals.  Arguably, the most numerous 
stakeholders of the nonprofit sector are those who--because of unemployment, disability, 
illness, caretaking responsibilities, natural disaster, and similar factors--cannot afford on 
their own to acquire the necessities of life.  When a redistributive charity operates, the 
charity’s directors, managers, employees, and volunteers are obligated to use the 
donations to alleviate the suffering of the intended beneficiaries. 
 
 Does the organization belong to others?  Yes, in several ways.  First, 
the board of directors of a 501(c)(3) does not represent stockholders as a 
for-profit corporate board does.  The board represents stakeholders, people 
who are involved with the organization--the people it serves, the community 
in general, funders, staff, and volunteers.  All are joined by a common 
interest and stake in the organization’s outcomes. 
  
 Second, the organization uses resources that have been purchased 
by the funds of others.  While it’s true that the organization earns these 
funds from others, it is also accountable to them to deliver the outcomes 
promised in the mission (Brinckerhoff, 2004, p. 26). 
 
It is impermissible for the organization’s leadership and staff to benefit from the 
organization’s operations by absorbing a disproportionately large amount of the 
resources and, therefore, impeding the redistribution of the resources to those in need, 
the intended recipients. 
 
 
F. The Argument for Ethical Practice 
 
1. PRIVILEGED STATUS OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 
 
 The United States has a long history of offering privileged legal status for 
philanthropic and religious organizations.  Governments at various levels offer to these 
organizations exemptions from income tax, state sales tax, and local property tax.  The 
Internal Revenue Service and other agencies have a hands-off policy with regard to 
churches in deference to the First Amendment’s free-exercise clause.  The privileged 
status is connected to an expectation that nonprofits will contribute to the public interest.  
Jeavons (2001, p. 109) writes: 
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 [Nonprofit] organizations are given a special standing, and even 
certain legal advantages over other private organizations, on the basis of the 
promise that they will serve the public god.  The public expects these 
organizations to be motivated by and adhere to such a commitment in their 
performance. 
 
 Brody (2002, p. 477) said, “Accepting nonprofit status as a signal of 
trustworthiness[] bestows a halo on any nonprofit organization regardless of merit.”  The 
assumption that nonprofits are committed to societal well-being more or less disarms the 
public, because Americans do not subject charities to scrutiny when deciding whether and 
how much to donate.  Fund-raisers are well aware of the gullibility of Americans, who, in 
studies conducted by newspapers and researchers, have been found to donate willingly to 
a “Heroin Fund for Addicts,” an “American Communist Refugee Fund,” a “National 
Society for Twinkletoed Children,” a fund to “Help Buy Rustproof Switchblades for 
Juvenile Delinquents,” a “National Growth Foundation for African Pygmies,” and a “Fund 
for the Widow of the Unknown Soldier” (Bakal, 1979, pp. 289-290). 
 
 
2. THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND STAKEHOLDERS 
 
 Taylor and Kelsey (2016, p. 62) state that people call for transparency when they 
believe that “someone is getting away without something they should not” and someone 
else is being mistreated. 
 
 We . . . focus our definition [of transparency] on those who lose out 
as a result of lack of transparency since, in the main, they are the people 
motivated to use transparency to change things. 
 
 . . . People who are calling for transparency may be certain--or may 
suspect--that somebody is doing them wrong.  Either way, what they are 
seeking is the information to evidence their beliefs or suspicions.  The role 
of transparency is to enable competing claims to be tested and evidenced. 
 
 People want this evidence in order to be able to do something.  The 
information has no power in and of itself.  It only brings about change to the 
degree that better evidence enables more effective use of the various 
mechanisms through which information can be turned into pressure for 
change--through political pressure, market pressures, or . . . discovery and 
learning.  Transparency is there to improve the effectiveness of 
accountability systems, market systems and systems for discovery and 
verification.  It needs to be defined in terms of the needs of people using 
these systems. 
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Bennis, Goleman, and Biederman (2008, p. 3) similarly explain, “When we speak 
of transparency and creating a culture of candor, we are really talking about the free flow 
of information within the organization and its many stakeholders, including the public.” 
 
At the international level, Bishop (2012, p. 18) reports, nongovernment 
organizations are asserting that “access to information is, in fact, a universal human right 
under international human rights law.”  Morrison (2014, p. 112) identifies historians, 
journalists, and police detectives as professionals who depend on access to information 
to do their jobs. 
 
 Gordon (2014, p. 193) states: 
 
 . . . [I]nformation asymmetry is also relevant to government 
transparency and brings up what is known as the “principal-agent” 
problem--referring to situations in which it is difficult to monitor the 
behavior of one’s rights. 
 
Principal-agent theory refers to a range of relationships in which a person (the 
“principal”) has a need that he cannot resolve on his own--because he lacks the 
equipment, manpower, or expertise to do so--so he appoints an entity (the “agent”) to 
help him.  The principal now has a challenge--i.e., to monitor the agent’s conduct to 
ensure that she is acting in the principal’s interests rather than acting solely to advance 
her own interests. This theory is applicable to the topic of nonprofit transparency.  In this 
context, the principals are the public in general and the assortment of stakeholders who, 
based on laws, rules, and written and oral agreements, have expectations that the 
nonprofit will be the agents that will serve the public interest, fulfill community needs, 
alleviate deprivation and suffering, and recognize and reward philanthropy.  Naturally, 
the principals require information to monitor the nonprofits’ fidelity to their obligations.  
That these agents are acting ethically is deemed a legitimate societal expectation.  The 
concepts of accountability and transparency are integral to the rationale that the 
principals are legally and morally entitled to confirm that their interests are being served 
by the agencies. 
 
 
3. CONTRIBUTION TO BENEFICENT SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS 
 
 Economic prosperity is facilitated when trusting people who have money to spend 
or invest put their money into circulation by purchasing goods and services, donating it, 
or investing in stocks and bonds.  Auger (2011, p. 22) writes: 
 
 . . . [A] positive attitude leads to positive behavioral intentions.  As 
an attitude, positive trust should be related to positive behavior intentions, 
including the intent to remain a customer or client rather than seek an 
alternative provider.  Conversely, without trust, consumers do not 
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purchase, donors do not give, shareholders do not invest, employees are less 
effective, and governments are skeptical of both for-profit and nonprofit 
organizations (Bandsuch, Pate, and Theis, 2008; J. E. Grunig & Huang, 
2000). 
 
When a consumer buys a higher priced brand-name product rather than a lower priced 
generic equivalent, the consumer is demonstrating trust in the established manufacturer. 
 
 The trust of American consumers is perpetuated by the assumption that the 
government is influencing providers of goods and services to act responsibly and 
honestly.  How effective the government’s regulatory agencies are in holding providers 
accountable is anyone’s guess.  Our experience is that most complaints to the U. S. Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC)--whose duties include enforcement of truth-in-advertising and 
truth-in-labeling policies--result in responses that indicate that no intervention is likely.  
In so far as energetic intervention by the FTC, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, 
the Food and Drug Administration, and other agencies is episodic and allows countless 
abuses to go unaddressed, their purpose is to create the impression that it is rational for 
consumers to spend their money confidently in the marketplace.  Consumer confidence 
is necessary for a healthy economy. 
 
 Bennis (2008, pp. vii-viii) has assigned the function of developing trust to 
organizational leaders.  He reflects: 
 
 As someone who has devoted much of his life to the study of leaders, 
I find myself talking about transparency--and thus about trust as 
well--whenever I talk about leadership.  An inclusive and appealing word, 
transparency encompasses candor, integrity, honesty, ethics, clarity, full 
disclosure, legal compliance, and a host of other things that allow us to deal 
fairly with each other. . . . 
 
 Trust and transparency are always linked. 
 
Auger (2011, p. 55) says that “transparency and its related attribute of trust are 
important for all organizations.”  But, she adds, “the need for transparency is different for 
a charitable nonprofit than for a business entity.”  Bekkers (2003, p. 596) continues the 
argument: 
 
 Philanthropic organizations depend on the public’s trust.  Donors 
often do not know what happens exactly to their donations, how much is 
saved for overhead costs, and where the money is actually spent.  This lack 
of transparency is dangerous because an occasional media report of poor 
performance and misallocation of funds may easily scandalize the entire 
philanthropic sector. 
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Jeavons (2001, p. 109) portrays the relationship between nonprofits and members 
of the public as being based on a special social contract. 
 
 There exists . . . an implicit social contract undergirding the presence 
and function of private nonprofit, especially philanthropic, organizations in 
our society.  These organizations are given a special standing, and even 
certain legal advantages over other private organizations, on the basis of the 
promise that they will serve the public good.  The public expects these 
organizations to be motivated by and adhere to such a commitment in their 
performance.  The public also expects that these organizations will honor a 
set of widely accepted moral and humanitarian values--deriving from these 
organizations’ historical and philosophical roots--and that they (virtually) 
never act in a self-serving manner. 
 
 
G. The Rationale for Transparency 
 
1. THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION 
 
 Democracy without transparency is a figment of the imagination.  Says Blind 
(2014, p. 6), “. . . [O]pen communication and free flow of information, answerability to 
citizens and accountability, and corruption control are essential ingredients of 
democracies.”  Officials of democracies embrace the principle of openness about as much 
as do officials of tyrannical regimes.  Bureaucrats have a natural predilection for secrecy.  
(See the editorial cartoon on the next page.)  If government officials habitually disclosed 
information about what they are doing, there would be little need for a literature that 
makes a case for transparency in government.  Some founders of American democracy 
made the case for openness.  Thomas Jefferson wrote, “The basis of our governments 
being the opinion of the people, [the people must have] full information” (quoted in 
Schwarz, 2015, p. 18).  Philip Freneau, editor of the National Gazette, the principal organ 
of Jefferson’s Democratic-Republican party, criticized the U. S. Senate’s practice of 
meeting secretly, equating it to “the secret privileges of the [British] House of Lords” 
(quoted in Schwarz, 2015, p. 21).  The Senate relented, but other government entities 
opted for secrecy.  As the national government’s “administrative state” was developing, 
Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 to require the national 
government’s regulatory agencies and commissions to make rules and regulations in the 
open--through notice-and-comment rulemaking or rulemaking by adjudicatory 
proceedings (Ball, 1984, p. 146).  Otherwise, it was not until 1966 that Congress enacted 
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and 1976 that it enacted the Government in the 
Sunshine Act.  The FOIA requires federal agencies to accept requests for documents and 
other information from citizens and either produce the information or show cause why it 
need not do so.  The sunshine law requires multi- member decision-making bodies to 
discuss and vote on policies in meetings that are open to the public.  We acknowledge that 
state governments  were earlier  adopters  of the  freedom-of-information and  sunshine 
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Reproduced in Brewster (1963, p. 161) 
 
policies than Congress was.  In any event, it is worth noting that the gestation period for 
these openness policies was roughly two centuries.  For that long, it seemed perfectly 
natural to American lawmakers that the suppression of information constituted sound 
operational procedure and defensible public policy.  To this day, researchers, right-to-
know advocates, and public-interest groups necessarily generate literature to explain why 
the government should release what should be public information from its clutches. 
 
 Many observers make the same argument about business firms.  Sarokin and 
Schulkin (2016, p. 95) note:  “‘Perfect information’ has stood . . . as an abstraction (and, 
as [Joseph E.] Stiglitz reminded us, as a largely unexplored assumption of modern 
economics). . . .”  Capitalist theory assumes that both parties to a voluntary marketplace 
transaction possess complete information so that each can determine that the exchange 
will serve her interests.  When consumers do not have access to accurate information 
about goods and services, the disadvantage that they suffer constitutes a “market failure” 
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that creates a justification for government intervention (e.g., when the FTC enforces 
truth-in-advertising and truth-in-labeling regulations).  Sarokin and Schulkin (2016, 
p. 103) offer an example of the kind of information to which consumers are entitled when 
they make purchasing decisions. 
 
 . . . Amazon and other online marketers generally don’t provide 
information to answer questions such as these: 
 Was this shirt made by child labor? 
 Does it have a small global warming “footprint”? 
 Are the dyes toxic? 
 Was the workplace a firetrap? 
 Are the workers treated with dignity? 
 Am I funding a warlord by purchasing this item? 
 
 Let’s call these questions about a product’s sustainability.  
Information that addresses these questions provides insight into how much 
a particular product contributes to or subtracts from the overall well-being 
of the world, with consideration given to the product’s economic, social, 
workplace, health, and environmental impacts. 
 
 It is also necessary that stockholder-owned corporations disclose information 
about its finances so that investors and prospective investors can make informed 
decisions about whether to invest in the company and when to sell the corporation’s stock 
and bonds.  Sarokin and Schulkin (2016, pp. 84-86) state that such corporations must 
generate reports that include the following information: 
 
 A general and plainly stated description of the company 
 Organization 
 Performance 
 Income 
 Expenses 
 Finances 
 Risk 
 Labor and compensation 
 Tax returns 
 
For the business sector, transparency is “[a]n old force with new power,” say 
Tapscott and Ticoll (2003, p. xi).  They elaborate: 
 
 [Transparency] is far more than the obligation to disclose basic 
financial information.  People and institutions that interact with firms are 
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gaining unprecedented access to all sorts of information about corporate 
behavior, operations, and performance.  Armed with new tools to find 
information about matters that affect them, stakeholders now scrutinize the 
firm as never before, inform others, and organize collective responses.  The 
corporation is becoming naked. 
 
 One who makes a donation to a nonprofit organization does not typically receive a 
tangible reward.  Fund-raising literature explains such intangible, intrinsic rewards as a 
good feeling or recognition.  However, if the donation causes a result that the donor did 
not anticipate, such as enriching a fund-raising professional rather than a person in need, 
then the donor arguably has a claim of which he is unaware. 
 
 Irish et al. (2004) state, “The public has a legitimate interest in knowing about the 
activities and sources of funds of many civic organizations.  Transparency to the public 
helps the civic sector to retain public trust” (p. 273).  Jeavons (2010, p. 179) explains the 
argument this way: 
 
 . . . [N]onprofit organizations--at least public charities (the 
501(c)(3)s)--are especially dependent on the public’s trust and goodwill to 
gain the support they need for the work they do.  These organizations are 
sometimes described as “values-expressive,” as being instrumental and 
critical to building “social capital” (a concept that centers on trust), and as 
being instruments of collective action for serving the public good. . . .  If they 
are not organizations of integrity, organizations that are trustworthy, then 
they generally will not be able to function effectively.  Why would people 
want to give their money or time to an organization if they have reason to 
doubt that [the] organization is representing itself and the work it does 
honestly and is using the contributions it receives well for the purpose of 
fulfilling its stated mission? . . . 
 
 Brinckerhoff (2004, p. 26) extends our argument about the difference between 
profit-making firms and nonprofits.  Nonprofits “belong” to people outside the 
organization. 
 
 . . . [D]oes the organization belong to others?  Yes, in several ways.  
First, the board of directors of a 501(c)(3) organization does not represent 
stockholders as a for-profit corporate board does.  The board represents 
stakeholders, people who are involved with the organization--the people it 
serves, the community in general, funders, staff, and volunteers.  All are 
joined by a common interest and stake in the organization’s outcomes. 
 
 Second, the organization uses resources that have been purchased 
by the funds of others.  While it’s true that the organization earns these 
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funds from others, it is also accountable to them to deliver the outcomes 
promised in the mission. 
 
 Therefore, Brinckerhoff (2004, p. 70) continues, the best rule about transparency 
is “the more, the better.” 
 
 The more people know about your organization, the better.  The more 
information they can see about plans, about services, and yes, about 
finances, the better.  The more open you are the better.  Period.  Which is 
not to say that it is easy, or always personally comfortable, to be transparent.  
But it’s the best thing by far for the mission, because open organizations are 
better at engaging their employees and volunteers than closed ones.  If 
people can see problems, if they are allowed to review plans, better ideas 
usually result (not always, but usually). . . .  
 
 Taylor and Kelsey (2016, pp. 61-62) summarize the theoretical rational for 
transparency. 
 
 We want to put the idea of fairness at the heart of our definition of 
transparency.  When people call for transparency they are, in the main, 
claiming that someone is getting away with something they should not and 
someone else is being treated unfairly or is at risk of being treated unfairly. 
 
 Transparency policy often focuses on the person or organisations 
alleged to be behaving badly and defines transparency in terms of the degree 
to which their freedom to do this is limited by having to reveal what they are 
doing.  We want, instead, to turn it around and focus our definition on those 
who lose out as a result of lack of transparency since, in the main, they are 
the people motivated to use transparency to change things. 
 
Access to information helps to level the playing field--i.e., to ameliorate the 
dependence of relatively powerless people on those who possess power and information.  
Henriques (2007, pp. 164-165) states: 
 
 Only the existence of a power relationship calls for transparency; the 
absence of a power relationship does not call for transparency.  There is no 
obligation to divulge information for its own sake, except perhaps as 
entertainment. . . . 
 
 The moral argument concerning the need for transparency wherever 
there are power relations therefore extends to both government and the 
voluntary sector. . . . 
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 Within the voluntary sector, those organizations that have 
campaigned for transparency from the [business] sector are being 
challenged to demonstrate comparable transparency themselves. . . .  [O]ne 
of the primary stakeholders to whom [nongovernment organizations] owe 
transparency will be their members and supporters, rather than the 
corporate sector. . . . 
 
 As the need for transparency has a moral foundation, those with 
power have a moral obligation to be transparent over how they exercise it. 
 
 
2. MECHANICS OF TRANSPARENCY 
 
 Transparency begins with a commitment.  Oliver (2004, p. 69) presents a list of 
attitudes and attributes. 
 
 Once a specific strategy is selected, execution aspects need to be 
addressed.  At a minimum, they include: 
 
● Board of Directors’ statement of overall policy and approach 
● Board of Directors’ governance programs to review progress 
● Senior management circulation and promulgation of transparency 
strategy 
● Specific, detailed, written, and widely communicated transparency 
practices covering the gathering, analysis, and reporting of 
organizational metrics 
● Institutionalizing transparency as part of key employee annual 
objectives 
● Programs for the documentation and protection of competitive 
assets and intelligence 
● Compliance programs for routine transparency programs 
● Establishment of future transparency analysis and monitoring 
teams 
● Engagement programs to encourage customer, partner, supplier 
participation, and support 
● Programs to recognize and reward exemplary performance 
● Whistleblower programs 
● Communication programs for key stakeholders 
 
 
 
SECRECY AND TRANSPARENCY IN NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 32 
 
 
● Establishment of feedback channels 
● Evaluation programs to monitor progress 
● Contingency plans to prepare for routine but unforeseen events or 
requests 
● Crisis management plans to deal with major catastrophes 
 
The effective mechanics of transparency are not commonly mechanisms that are 
comfortable or convenient.  Some organizational leaders are content to publish 
information that is useless or misleading.  This stratagem is available because of the 
volume of information in organizations’ possession, especially in the era of big data. 
 
 Selective disclosure or edited disclosure, in which the subject of 
transparency has been able to exercise control over the information to their 
advantage, can reduce transparency rather than increase it.  What matters 
is transparency that gives me equal or similar narrative power--the ability 
to build a case, whether in a court or in the press.  For transparency to work 
it needs to put narrative power into the hands of those who lack executive 
power. 
 
 . . . Power over information today consists more in the control of big 
data assets than in the ability to conceal specific documents or pieces of 
information.  By that measure, the world is becoming less, not more 
transparent (Taylor and Kelsey, 2016, pp. 69, 115). 
 
 One clever maneuver that some organizations use to appear to be transparent 
while leaving stakeholders uninformed is to flood consumers with useless information.  
Henriques (2007, p. 163) says, “One way in which idiot transparency can occur is when a 
surplus of information is displayed.  This may be well-intentioned but naïve, or it may be 
manipulative and deliberately designed to conceal.”  Auger (2011, pp. 48-49) writes: 
 
 . . . Pasquier and Villeneuve (2007) documented five organizational 
behaviors that can restrict transparency:  (1) non-transparency, where 
organizations are not required by law to be transparency and, therefore, are 
not; (2) averted transparency, whereby the organization actively and 
illegally prevents access to information, (3) obstructed transparency, 
whereby the organization uses all legal means to limit access to information; 
(4) strained transparency, which involves consciously or unconsciously 
limited access to information because of limited resources or familiarity 
with the documents; and (5) maximized transparency, whereby all 
information is made available but without filing systems, indexes or 
registers to help organize or find the information needed.  As the scholars 
noted, “Too much transparency may destroy transparency” (p. 152).  In 
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other words, organizations may provide all the information relating to an 
issue, involving hundreds of documents, which make it difficult for those 
interested to find the specific information they seek, if no index or other 
document organizing material is also supplied. 
 
Auger (2011, pp. 47-48) adds that Guidestar calls for charities to supply 
information on its own initiative and in a way that genuinely informs the public. 
 
 Guidestar (2008), an online organizer and distributor of nonprofit 
and philanthropic database information, noted that “transparency is closely 
linked with accountability, as the release of relevant information helps 
institutions hold themselves accountable for their performance” (p. 7). 
 
 Conversely, Guidestar (2008) also noted that “releasing information 
only upon request often acts as an impediment to disclosure and frustrates 
meaningful transparency” (p. 8).  Advocates and critics of transparency 
have noted the difficulties inherent with this construct.  Rawlins (2009) 
advised, “Disclosure alone can defeat the purpose of transparency.  It can 
obfuscate, rather than enlighten” (p. 74).  And Scott (2004) cautioned that 
“transparency[] is about much more than the corporate reports made to 
stakeholders. . . .  Transparency either pervades the organization or is 
merely a clever one-way mirror attempting to hide the contents from public 
view” (p. 48). 
 
Taylor and Kelsey (2016, p. 210) list the bases for organizational leaders to obstruct 
the flow of useful information.  They possess the power to determine the following: 
 
● [W]hat is and what is not recorded 
● [T]he format, definitions and descriptions of what is recorded 
● [W]hich other parties information is shared with 
● [T]he content of what is shared with other parties, including 
powers of redaction for deliberative privacy, personal privacy, 
commercial confidentiality and national security 
● [T]he format of information that is shared with other parties 
● [T]he terms on which information is shared with other parties 
 
Stevenson (1980, pp. 12-13, 185-187) says that there should be a freedom-of-
information process that obligates companies to disclose information whenever they 
cannot demonstrate that such disclosure is contrary to the public interest.  Mulgan (2014, 
p. 4) states, “. . . [P]ublic access to information is of little value unless the information is 
presented in a form that makes sense to outsiders.” 
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Perhaps the principal mechanism of transparency in the nonprofit sector is IRS 
Form 990.  Nonprofits are required to file the full-scale 990 form (which, with 
attachments, can involve more than 1000 pages) if they have “(1) gross receipts greater 
than or equal to $200,000 or (2) total assets greater than or equal to $500,000 at the end 
of the tax year,” says the IRS.  The content of 990 forms is public information.  On this 
form, a nonprofit organization reports revenues; expenditures; compensation paid to 
officers, key employees, and directors; and information about the governing board. 
 
Some policymakers and watchdogs complain that aspects of the 990 filing 
requirement spare nonprofits from demanding accountability for a number of reasons. 
 
 The financial data are not necessarily reported in accordance with Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles.  Marcus Owens, director of the IRS Exempt 
Organizations Technical Division, said, “. . . [T]he level of tax compliance 
among a number of tax-exempt groups is at a ‘Third World Level’” (quoted in 
Bennett and DiLorenzo, 1994, p. 78). 
 
 The financial data have not necessarily undergone external audit (Behn, 
DeVries, and Jing, 2010, p. 6).  Even if they have, Bennett and DiLorenzo (1994, 
p. 77) observe, charities and auditors have a “cozy relationship” because of the 
“substantial auditing fees that major charities pay.”  They ask: 
 
When large fees are at stake, what auditor of any health 
charity will raise the roof about shuffling a few numbers around here 
and there, especially if there is no absolute prohibition against it?  
After all, it is not the job of the auditors to determine whether the 
funds were appropriately spent on charitable purposes; if that were 
the case, the United Way of America scandal should have been 
uncovered years earlier. 
 
 “. . . [O]ne study observed [that] many nonprofit organizations apparently 
intentionally misclassify or aggregate various sensitive information items such 
as fundraising expenses . . .” (Behn et al., 2010, p. 7). 
 
 Nonprofits can report all sorts of overhead, travel, employee pay, etc., as 
“program expenses.”  Bennett and DiLorenzo (1994, p. 70) explain: 
 
The reason that financial information offers few insights into 
charitable activities is simple:  By accounting convention, the costs 
of providing program services are counted as part of the services 
themselves.  The problems created by this accounting practice are 
easily illustrated by a clear-cut example.  Suppose that two health 
charities, A and B, spend all of their income each year on aid to 
disease victims.  Both charity A and charity B collect $100,000 in a 
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given year and both report spending $100,000 on patient services.  
Both appear to be highly efficient and equally deserving of support, 
but these “facts” can be deceiving.  Charity A has one staff member 
paid $20,000 per year to distribute $80,000 in cash assistance to 
patients, while charity B hires four staff members at $20,000 each to 
distribute $20,000 to patients.  Charity A is apparently far more 
efficient and deserving of support than is charity B, since four times 
as much cash assistance reaches those in need.  Yet the amount 
reported spent on patient services in the audited financial statements 
is the same for both charities:  $100,000!  Thus, it is not possible to 
determine whether expenditures on staff are as low as possible or 
whether the payroll is padded with paramours, cronies, or nepotistic 
nieces and nephews. 
 
It is common practice for charities to charge a large proportion of fund-raising 
expenses off to “public education.”  They will justify the accounting trick by 
citing aspects of the fund-raising letters and inserts that explain the disease or 
other problem that the charity’s mission addresses.  As an example, solicitation 
letters from the American Cancer Society will be accompanied by an insert that 
lists the “seven warning signs of cancer.”  By enclosing the insert, the 
organization can charge much of the cost of the mailing off to “public 
education” (Bennett and DiLorenzo, 1994, pp. 76-77). 
 
Those nonprofits that are not required to file the full-scale Form 990 but want to 
keep their tax-exempt status must file some simpler version:  990-EZ, 990-BL, 990-N, 
or 1065. 
 
 Given their druthers, organizations can ordinarily be expected to disclose as little 
information as it can get away with.  Taylor and Kelsey (2016, p. 210) explain it this way: 
 
 . . . [O]rganisations which are implementing transparency systems 
[can be expected] to lean, whether deliberately or unconsciously, towards 
systems that minimise the degree to which information is available in 
formats that allow them to be held accountable. 
 
 The central issue of concern here is the degree to which the 
organisation subject to transparency can retain a degree of editorial control 
over information flow. . . .  [I]f an organisation has unaccountable 
monopoly control over any part of the flow of information--from the design 
of the content, through to the way it is recorded, analysed, and 
presented--we can expect this to be exploited to reduce accountability and 
increase opportunities for corruption. . . . 
 
 
 
 
SECRECY AND TRANSPARENCY IN NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 36 
 
 
 Behn, DeVries, and Lin (2010, p. 7) are among those who have offered suggestions 
for reform.  They have proposed the following measures: 
 
 Certain states . . . recommend, but do not require, [that] nonprofit 
organizations adopt the provisions of [the] Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) to 
enhance institutional accountability and responsibility (McCarthy & Mattie, 
2003).  The North Carolina Center for Nonprofits (2003), for example, 
notes[,] “. . . although SOX was aimed at the business community, 
[attorneys general] around the country are using it as a template for 
nonprofit reform and regulation. . . .  To model best practices, nonprofits 
should proactively adopt . . . provisions of SOX.” 
 
 The Senate Finance Committee proposed requiring CEOs to sign 
(under penalty of perjury) a declaration to implement processes and 
procedures ensuring the returns’ compliance with IRS code and to 
reasonably assure accuracy and completeness (U. S. Senate, 2004). . . .  The 
Senate recommended reforms to achieve greater transparency and to 
ensure exempt organizations’ accurate, timely, consistent, and informative 
reporting (U. S. Senate, 2004) including provisions that organizations with 
gross receipts over $250,000 be independently audited and required to post 
on their websites federally required information.  But, legislation to that end 
has languished, to the disadvantage of the American public. 
 
 The Independent Sector organization developed a report describing 33 principles 
for good governance and ethical practice.  Principle 7 establishes sound standards for 
disclosure of information.  Corbett (2011, pp. 25-26) explains Principle 7: 
 
 Principle 7 requires public access to information about operations, 
governance finances, programs, and activities.  Second, the principle 
encourages organizations to provide public access to methods used to 
evaluate outcomes of their work and the evaluation results. . . . 
 
 The first requirement raises the question of public versus proprietary 
records. . . . 
 
 The second requirement raised in Principle 7 is that nonprofits are 
encouraged to make evaluation methods available to the public--a step that 
can be readily implemented for nonprofits with written evaluation methods, 
which many nonprofits likely already have.  Those nonprofits without 
methods need to develop them.  While challenging, measurable evaluation 
criteria can be developed and may vary widely depending on the 
organization’s mission, goals, programs, and values. . . . 
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 The third aspect of Principle 7 pertains to evaluation results.  Some 
results, depending on what is evaluated and the findings, may fall within the 
proprietary area.  As a result, an organization will need to have a process to 
assess, and determinations would likely have to be made on a case-by-case 
basis, by the board. . . . 
 
 
3. PRACTICAL ADVANTAGES 
 
 a. Fairness.  A fundamental advantage of transparency is that it makes human 
relationships fairer.  Taylor and Kelsey (2016, pp. 66-67) explain: 
 
 Our contention is that a fair society can only exist when there is 
sufficient transparency to enable me to assent to the rules of that society 
and judge them as fair.  Transparency is the means by which we can 
collectively agree that the allocation systems that regulate our lives--legal, 
administrative and market driven--are indeed fair. 
 
 The first and simplest way in which transparency can help ensure 
fairness is by allowing the public to play a role in ensuring that rules are 
applied correctly.  The most basic form of corruption is the deliberate 
flouting of such rules for personal gain.  Transparency of this sort is often 
used as an additional policing mechanism to support regulatory activity.  To 
the degree that regulators are reliable and can be trusted, this process may 
not be seen as necessary.  On the other hand, risks of regulatory capture . . . 
and the question of who guards the guardians are good reasons for believing 
that this level of transparency is necessary. 
 
 There is then a second way in which transparency ensures 
fairness--which is ensuring that the rules themselves are fair.  But how do 
we judge if the rules are fair?  Here, transparency is the only mechanism we 
have to try to reach a collective agreement. 
 
 b. Efficiency.  Efficiency in the economy occurs when mutually agreeable 
marketplace transactions occur, leading to the occurrence of more transactions.  
Efficiency is not fostered when misinformation causes investors and consumers to direct 
their resources toward unproductive purposes. 
 
 Efficiency occurs when investors correctly categorise investments 
according to their likely return, consumers correctly categorise products 
according to the benefits and harms they produce, employers correctly 
categorise employees for promotion or redundancy according to their value, 
government departments correctly categorise services for funding 
allocations (Taylor and Kelsey, 2016, p. 70). 
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 c. Quality.  Transparency which co-exists with good management leads to higher 
quality of outputs. 
 
 The best firms . . . understand that investments in good governance 
and transparency deliver significant payoffs:  engaged relationships, better 
quality and cost management, more innovation, and improved overall 
business performance.  They build transparency and integrity into their 
business strategy, products and services, brand and reputation, technology 
plans, and corporate character (Tapscott and Ticoll, 2003, p. xiv). 
 
 d. Sustainability.  As Sarokin and Schulkin (2016, p. 103) noted, when consumers 
have the information that they need to know “how much a particular product contributes 
to or subtracts from the overall well-being of the world,” they can make a better, more 
socially responsible purchasing decision. 
 
 e. Trust.  When nonprofit organizations act in accordance with the principle of 
transparency, they can earn the confidence of the public.  Oliver (2004, pp. 7-8) writes: 
 
 Many charity organizations control a budget larger than the gross 
national product of small countries and wield tremendous influence in the 
regions where they operate.  Their actions can literally mean the difference 
between life and death.  Nonprofit organizations are ranked (by the media, 
for instance) on how efficient they are with donor dollars (how much goes 
to aid, how much to overhead), as well as their record of accomplishments.  
If their records are opaque and they cannot account for donations, they face 
a crisis in both their budget and their relationship with local leaders.  
Transparency is also critical to the credibility of international bodies from 
relatively small nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) like Greenpeace to 
huge global NGOs like the Red Cross. 
 
 An organization that depends on contributions from donors is under 
the microscope like no other.  People vote with their wallet in the 
commercial decisions they make every day, but they are even more likely to 
vote with their wallet when it comes to charity.  This kind of expenditure is 
frequently the most emotional, so the decision often comes down to comfort 
and confidence.  If a nonprofit organization appears to be hiding something 
or has lost face through a public scandal, donations are certain to plummet 
and may take years to recover. 
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H. Mechanics and Implications at the Organizational Level 
 
1. MECHANICS 
 
 Kerpen (2013, p. 67) suggests that transparency in practice begins with a 
principled commitment. 
 
 Transparency isn’t just about implementing a system for 
communication:  it’s a philosophy, an entire policy that should extend to 
every area of your business.  Being transparent guarantees a level of 
accountability in which each member of the company openly takes 
responsibility for his or her work and actions.  The opposite is just as real:  
a lack of integrity and trust in your company is your virus, spreading 
cynicism and a decrease in faith, motivation, and productivity. 
 
 Gebler (2012, pp. 159-160, 163) states that the implementation of the transparency 
principle takes time and conscious intention. 
 
 An organization cannot become transparent overnight.  It must make 
its way through incremental steps to create both the necessary trust and 
processes.  To have a culture in which employees know that their decisions 
will be supported and that questions can be raised, leadership needs to 
ensure that four essential elements are in place.  It must: 
 
● Aggressively enforce its principles and not only its standards.  
Standards tend to be easier to enforce than principles because 
standards are more like rules. 
● Create a safe place for questions to be raised. 
● Ensure that leaders don’t become isolated, losing touch with the 
issues and challenges their employees face.  My number one piece 
of advice on this point to the leaders in my client companies is:  Get 
out from behind your desks! 
● Get to the heart of the issue.  There are always reasons that people 
do what they do.  If you don’t get to the root cause of why the truth 
cannot be told, then the truth will never be told. 
 
 . . . For employees to trust in transparency, they must first feel safe 
physically, financially, and emotionally.  There can be no fear of raising 
difficult issues or admitting mistakes; undue pressure and fear of losing 
one’s job make these difficult or impossible.  Transparency is also build on 
respect.  Employees must feel they have a personal relationship with their 
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leaders that allows them to be comfortable taking the risk of bringing up a 
touchy subject. 
 
 The first step to creating a safe place for the truth to be told is to be 
sure that senior leaders even know what the issue is. 
 
 
2. ADVANTAGES 
 
 [Pending] 
 
 
3. RISKS 
 
 [Pending] 
 
 
I. The Role of Managerial Culture 
 
 Considering the surfeit of pitfalls associated with the lack of transparency in 
nonprofit organizations, and the apparent number of boards of national organizations 
that choose to maintain secrecy regarding their board meetings, one may wonder whether 
there is any hope for a charitable organization to truly gain the trust of its stakeholders.  
The answer is yes, although the road is paved with caveats.  Nonprofit organizations face 
challenges regarding operations that are unique to them.  In a for-profit organization, if a 
founding proprietor wishes to be transparent about his organization, he does so, and 
those who seek to stymie the flow of information are terminated and replaced with others 
who will espouse the value of transparency.  However, in a nonprofit organization, a 
founder or president is impeded by a board of trustees from carrying out her vision in the 
manner that she sees fit.  This is where culture becomes essential to the transparency of 
an organization. 
 
 Gebler (2012, pp. 150-151) asserts that transparency arises from a planned process. 
 
 Transparency is the end result of a focused and well-defined process 
that builds toward it.  The companies that have successfully instilled 
transparency have systematically asserted what factors thwart being open 
and then have developed systems to ensure that the blocking behaviors are 
nullified and the positive behaviors encouraged. . . . 
 
 Transparency connects and aligns what an organization does--its 
standards of behavior--with what it stands for--its principles and beliefs.  
When that happens, the organization is characterized by both 
clarity--everyone knows what is behind the leaders’ actions and 
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decisions--and truth--anyone can safely ask questions and point out gaps 
between actions and values.  The ability of employees and leadership to 
openly discuss the conflicts between principles and standards is at the heart 
of transparency. 
 
 Citing the work of Benjamin Schneider and Edgar H. Schein, Ostroff, Kinicki, and 
Tamkins introduce the concepts of organizational culture and climate. 
 
Organizational culture and climate focus on how organizational 
participants experience and make sense of organizations . . . and are 
fundamental building blocks for describing and analyzing organizational 
phenomena. . . .  Although culture and climate have been approached from 
different scholarly traditions and have their roots in different disciplines, 
they are both about understanding psychological phenomena in 
organizations.  Both concepts rest upon the assumption of shared 
meaning--a shared understanding of some aspect of organizational context 
(Ostroff, Kinicki, and Tamkins, 2003, p. 565). 
 
 Organizational culture is the deep structure of an organization, rooted in the 
beliefs, values, and assumptions of the members, but established by the 
leadership/founder (Denison, 1996).  Although culture covers all group functioning and 
integrates all aspects of an organization, it is so deep that it can be viewed only through 
manifestations (Schein, 2004).  Schneider explains: 
 
 . . . [P]eople in work settings form climate perceptions because 
apprehending order in the world is a basic human chore and . . . these 
climate perceptions function as frames of reference against which the 
appropriateness of behavior may be judged for the balance or homeostasis 
it will achieve with the setting (Schneider, 1975, p. 460). 
 
Ostroff et al. (2003, p. 566) elaborate: 
 
 Individuals can sense the climate upon entering an organization 
through things such as the physical appearance of the place, the 
emotionality and attitudes exhibited by employees, and the experience and 
treatment of visitors and new employee members. 
 
This is where organizational climate becomes important, as culture leads to climate, 
which is the policies, practices, and procedures of an organization (Schneider, 1975). 
 
Climate develops from the deeper core of culture. . . .  
[O]rganizational culture is expected to effect [sic] structure, practices, 
policies, and routines in the organization that in turn provide the context 
for climate perceptions.  These organizational practices are the means 
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through which employee perceptions, and subsequent attitudes, responses, 
and behaviors, are shaped (Ostroff et al., 2003, pp. 566-567). 
 
Climate is used to determine the appropriateness of behaviors in an organization, and can 
be specifically targeted toward any aspect of the organization (Glick, 1985), such as a 
climate for openness, which describes the authenticity and openness of interactions 
between leaders and their employees (Raza, 2010).  
 
 Baum and Kling (2004, p. 6) list principles that a transparent company need to 
have. 
 
 The transparent company fosters a culture of openness and 
inclusion, and therefore is able to adapt to unexpected shifts in market 
conditions by simply doing the right thing. 
 
 There are three principles a transparent company must have: 
 
● a leader who believes in telling the truth 
● a values-based corporate culture 
● employees who are “people people” (service-oriented)/team 
players. 
 
While climates for transparency have been sparsely researched in the extant 
literature, when there is a strong culture and climate of transparency set by the leaders of 
the organization, there are several important implications for organizational functioning.  
The first manner in which a climate for transparency will impact an organization is via 
trust and ethics.  When transparency exists in an organization, there must be a strong 
adherence to ethics by all members of the leadership, and this can be monitored both 
internally from within the organization and externally by the constituents.  This is 
beneficial to the leadership, as there are more opportunities for any oversights to be found 
and remedied before they cause problems and, if there is an oversight, it provides the 
organization a chance to prove its trustworthiness to the constituents through the 
measures it takes to resolve the issue.  Prior research has shown that problems can often 
breed loyalty to an organization, as customers tend to remember the way an issue was 
handled much more clearly than the issue itself.  This system also builds trust, as leaders 
who are open and honest in communications and relationships have been shown to build 
trust over time (Hess and Bacigalupo, 2011).  This trust will be fostered both within the 
organization and externally.  This transparent climate additionally influences effective 
communication once trust and ethics are solidified because communication is not, and 
should never be, a one-way street, especially not in the circumstance that the 
communication is coming in the form of constituents and stakeholders clamoring for 
answers and information from an ever silent organization.  In order to be effective, 
communication must be a two-way channel that involves information flowing from the 
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organization and feedback being returned from those who receive this information.  
Stakeholders cannot deliver feedback and input without being properly informed, and 
this puts the organization in a precarious position in which it faces the potential to miss 
out on invaluable learning opportunities for continuous improvement and growth and it 
loses touch with its constituents, making it difficult to adapt to changing conditions.  
 
Let us return to the issue of the special circumstances of a nonprofit organization 
and the impediment that the board can present to a founder’s vision.  It is imperative that 
the founder establish the culture and climate that he desires for his organization 
purposively and immediately.  “Culture has been viewed as a key driver of organizational 
effectiveness and performance . . . and a source of sustained competitive advantage” 
(Ostroff et al., 2003, p. 571).  Schneider (1987) adds:  “. . . [B]y what they reward, support, 
and expect, organizations can indicate that customer service or safety or product quality 
is an organizational imperative” (p. 448).  If a founder wishes to have a culture and 
climate for transparency, he can develop a mission statement, a statement of core values, 
and a code of ethics that includes transparency and that is featured prominently with any 
materials regarding the organization.  Brown and Treviño wrote: 
 
 In a corporate environment [in which] ethics messages can get lost 
amidst messages about the bottom line and the immediate tasks at hand, 
ethical leaders also focus attention on ethics by frequently communicating 
about ethics and making the ethics message salient.  They set clear and high 
ethical standards themselves.  They also use rewards and punishment to 
influence followers’ ethical behavior.  Research shows that reinforcement 
plays an important role in modeling effectiveness because observers pay 
close attention to those who control important resources and to rewards and 
punishments (Brown and Treviño, 2006, pp. 597-598). 
 
 Bennis, Goleman, and Biederman (2008, p. 23) indicate that the leader himself 
must eschew secrecy as a desired state. 
 
 Leaders who will thrive and whose organizations will flourish in this 
era of ubiquitous electronic tattletales are the ones who strive to make their 
organizations as transparent as possible.  Despite legitimate moral and legal 
limits on disclosure, leaders should at least aspire to a policy of “no secrets.” 
 
In addition, the founder must actively embody the values he espouses by being 
transparent himself.  Bennis et al. (2008, p. 25) warn about the shimmer effect: 
 
The so-called shimmer factor is a third common impediment to the 
free flow of information. . . .  [Leaders] . . . tend to be perceived by many as 
demigods.  And that perception still deters followers from telling those 
leaders essential but awkward truths. 
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Thus, they state, “The best antidote to the shimmer effect is the behavior of the leader.”  
If the founder disavows secrecy, this will ensure that those who become active members 
of the administration of the organization, including the board and executive director, will 
share the values upon which the organization is founded in accordance with the 
attraction-selection-attrition cycle (ASA) (Schneider, 1987).  This cycle occurs when a 
founder establishes a culture and a climate conducive to her values.  People with similar 
values are attracted to the organization, and are thus selected.  “. . . [A]lignment [among] 
culture, practices, and climate is necessary for employees to respond and behave in ways 
that will lead to organizational effectiveness” (Ostroff et al., 2003, p. 576).  Those 
employees who are selected but whose values are incompatible with the organization 
leave, and thus the organization becomes a function of the values of the members.  As 
Benjamin Schneider (1987, pp. 440, 448) stated: 
 
 Different kinds of organizations attract, select, and retain different 
kinds of people, and it is the outcome of the ASA cycle that determines why 
organizations look and feel different from each other. 
  
The ASA framework provides a new vantage point from which one 
can understand the genesis of both climate and culture.  As noted earlier, 
the processes and structures that emerge in organizations are functions of 
the kinds of people in them behaving in ways that facilitate the 
accomplishments of the goals of the founder. 
 
 Jeavons (2010, pp. 180-181) makes this argument: 
 
. . . I argue . . . that we are most likely to see consistently ethical 
behavior among nonprofit managers and organizations only where an 
emphasis on ethical values and behavior is deeply embedded in the cultures 
of these organizations.  So, building and reinforcing that kind of 
organizational culture becomes a primary responsibility for those desiring 
that ethical practice be a hallmark of all the functions, including the 
management, of their organization. 
  
. . . [T]he claim argued here is that truly ethical behavior will be 
assured only by creating an organizational culture in which key ethical 
ideals and expectations are incorporated in the ‘core values’ . . . of an 
organization and thus permeate its operations. 
 
 In sum, there is hope for the future of transparency in nonprofit organizations, but, 
in order for that vision to be realized, founders must truly comprehend the importance of 
transparency and be mindful in the actions that they take in order to ensure that their 
organization does not fall prey to a shroud of secrecy once a board is legally in control.  
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J. Strategies for Obtaining Transparency 
 
1. EXPANDING THE ROLE OF CONSUMER WATCHDOGS 
 
 [Pending] 
 
 
2. EDUCATING DONORS 
 
 [Pending] 
 
 
3. MODIFICATIONS TO LAWS ABOUT THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 
 
 [Pending] 
 
 
4. TRAINING FOR ETHICS 
 
 [Pending] 
 
 
K. Survey of Georgia Organizations 
 
1. DATA AND SAMPLE 
 
We collected data from Charity Navigator for nonprofit organizations located in 
the State of Georgia.  These data include information on the nonprofit sector in which the 
organization operated, the total revenue of the organization from fiscal year 2015, the 
salary of the executive director, the percentage of total expenses that the executive 
director salary makes up, the gender of the executive director, the presence of audited 
financials on the organization’s website, the existence of a conflict of interest policy, the 
existence of a whistleblower policy, and whether the board members are listed on the 
website.  In total, we identified 85 organizations that had data on Charity Navigator and 
had contact information listed.  We sent requests to these 85 organizations for 
information regarding the minutes of board meetings.  Specifically, we wanted to know 
whether the organization holds board meetings, whether minutes are kept, whether these 
minutes are available upon request, and whether they are available on the website.  
Seventeen organizations responded after the first request, while seven responded after 
the second request.  
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2. ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
 
a. Descriptive analysis.  For our initial analysis, we included only the 24 
organizations that responded “yes” or “no” to our request.  For our second analysis, we 
included the organizations that did not respond to our request and coded these as not 
providing audited financial statements; therefore, the second analysis included the total 
sample of 85.  
 
A broad range of nonprofit categories are represented in this study.  In the entire 
sample of organizations, 31.76% are involved in human services, 15.29% in health, 10.59% 
in religion, 9.41% in community development, 7.06% in international, 7.06% in 
environment, 7.06% in humanities, 5.88% in animals, 3.53% in research and public 
policy, and 2.35% in education.  The sampled organizations also represent a wide range 
of revenue totals, from $55,556 to $606,488,670 in a fiscal year (M = 25,799,531, SD = 
82,706,616).  Male executive directors lead 53.09% of the organizations, while 46.91% are 
led by females. 
 
b. Linear regressions.  We first ran linear regression analyses on only the 
organizations responding to our request.  The only variable that demonstrated predictive 
ability for availability of board meeting minutes was the presence of audited financials on 
the organization’s website, but it reached only marginal significance.   
 
Predictor  B  SE  β  t  α 
Category of Nonprofit  .00  .06  ‐.01  ‐0.04  .49 
Conflict of Interest Policy 
Whistleblower Policy 
.61 
.61 
.51 
.51 
.25 
.25 
1.19 
1.19 
.13 
.13 
Audited Financials Available on Website  .33  .23  .29  1.44  .08* 
Form 990 Available on Website  .02  .23  .02  0.07  .47 
Leader Compensation % of Expenses  .02  .04  .13  0.60  .28 
Total Revenue for Fiscal Year  .00  .00  .13  0.60  .29 
Board Listed & Not Compensated           
Note:  n = 24; final variable unable to calculate due to restriction of range 
 
Next, we conducted linear regression analyses of all of the organizations contacted, 
with those not responding over three times coded as not providing minutes of their board 
meetings.  The only variable that significantly predicts availability of board meeting 
minutes is the presence of audited financials available on the organization’s website, 
which accounted for approximately 3% of the variance in the availability of minutes of 
board meetings. 
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Predictor  B  SE  β  t  α 
Category of Nonprofit  ‐.02  .02  ‐.13  ‐1.17  .11 
Conflict of Interest Policy 
Whistleblower Policy 
.17 
.18 
.17 
.16 
.11 
.12 
1.02 
1.12 
.16 
.14 
Audited Financials Available on Website  .14  .09  .18  1.63  .05* 
Form 990 Available on Website  .07  .08  .10  0.89  .19 
Leader Compensation % of Expenses  .00  .00  ‐.06  ‐0.51  .31 
Total Revenue for Fiscal Year  .00  .00  .13  1.22  .11 
Board Listed & Not Compensated  .17  .19  .10  0.90  .19 
Note:  n = 85 
 
 
L. Conclusion 
 
 Make no mistake about it:  Countless leaders of nonprofit organizations can read 
this paper and a library full of books and journals advocating transparency, and they will 
be unmoved by them and continue to assert their privilege to shroud their operations in 
secrecy.  The secrecy will not subside as long as Americans reinforce these leaders’ 
behavior by filling the secretive organizations’ coffers with a steady supply of money.  
Transparency will be hard to come by until donors direct their support to organizations 
that open their books to the public.  We propose that the charity watchdog organizations 
abandon the notion that nonprofit organizations have the ethical right to conceal the 
minutes of their board meetings.  Here is a modest proposal to individuals who are 
approached by a charity for a donation:  Ask the fund-raiser for copies of the minutes of 
the charity’s last two or three board meetings.  If the fund-raiser protests that the best 
interests of the organization are served by keeping the board’s proceedings confidential, 
explain that you choose to act in your best interest as well by conserving your resources.  
Feel free to find some other charity that recognizes donors’ right to know.  They do exist. 
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